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In addition to their direct effects, episodes of financial instability may decrease investor 
confidence.  Measuring the impact of a crisis on investor confidence is complicated by 
the fact that it is difficult to disentangle the effect of investor confidence from coincident 
direct effects of the crisis.  In order to isolate the effects of financial crises on investor 
confidence, we study the investment behavior of immigrants in the U.S.  Our findings 
indicate that systemic banking crises have important effects on investor behavior.   
Immigrants who have experienced a banking crisis in their countries of origin are 
significantly less likely to have bank accounts in the U.S.  This finding is robust to 
including important individual controls like wealth, education, income, and age.  In 
addition, the effect of crises is robust to controlling for a variety of country of origin 
characteristics, including measures of financial and economic development and 
specifications with country of origin fixed effects. 
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Turmoil in global financial markets during 2007 and 2008 makes it clear that banking 
crises are a continuing challenge, even for developed countries.  In this recent episode we 
have seen old-fashioned bank runs, with depositors lining up to get their deposits out of 
banks like Northern Rock in the U.K. and IndyMac in the United States.  During the past 
twenty-five years, the frequency and severity of financial crises has grown.  About 113 
system-wide banking crises have occurred in 93 countries since 1980 (Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 2002).   
Financial crises tend to be costly in terms of output loss, employment and economic 
growth.  Recent estimates suggest that output losses associated with banking crises 
amounted to an average of 12.8 percent of GDP (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003).
1 
Financial crises can impact economic growth through several channels. Borrowers may 
reduce consumption or investment in response to a sudden increase in the cost of credit or 
a decline in the availability of credit. In addition, changes in asset prices may generate 
changes in wealth that affect investor and firm behavior. 
In addition to their direct effects, episodes of financial instability may decrease investor 
confidence.  Decreased confidence in the banking sector can prolong recovery following 
a crisis and reduce the perceived credibility of post-crisis reforms.  Measuring the impact 
of a crisis on investor confidence is complicated by the fact that it is difficult to 
disentangle indirect effects from coincident direct effects of the crisis.  Both the direct 
and the indirect effects will reinforce one another at a time of crisis:  reduced wealth and 
increased uncertainty will diminish investment as will weakened confidence in the 
financial sector.  According to Gerard Caprio of the Worldbank, “Crises … leave citizens 
wary of entrusting their savings to the official banking sector.  This diversion of savings 
is likely one of the great and unmeasured costs of banking crises.” 
 
Despite the importance of investor confidence in determining the cost of a crisis and 
paths to recovery, it is largely unstudied.  In this paper, we isolate the indirect effects of 
financial crises on investor confidence.  We do this by studying the investment behavior 
of immigrants in the U.S.  If episodes of financial instability have lasting effects on 
investor confidence, then immigrants who have experienced a crisis may make different 
financial choices compared to their counterparts who have not lived through a financial 
crisis. 
 
Nearly 10 percent of U.S. residents were born abroad, coming from a large and diverse 
set of countries.  Nationally representative U.S. data sets provide us with information on 
the financial decisions of a large group of individuals who may have experienced 
systemic financial crises prior to migration.  While household wealth, even post-
migration, may be directly impacted by financial crises in the origin country, the data that 
we use include information on household wealth, so we are able to control for these 
effects in our empirical analysis.  We augment the individual level data with country of 
                                                 
1 Mexico's 1994 banking crisis cost almost 10% of GDP. In South Korea and Chile, recent banking crisis 
were even more costly, amounting to 24% of GDP and 30% of GDP, respectively.   origin data on the timing and duration of systemic banking crises, information on the 
regulatory and financial environment as well as information on the quality of governance, 
the level of development and other important country of origin characteristics. 
 
By analyzing how immigrants’ financial decisions in the U.S. are influenced by crises in 
their countries of origin, we can explore how these events shape behavior.  In addition to 
documenting whether exposure to systematic financial crises impacts future behavior, we 
can also explore how the effects of behavior differ across individuals.  For example, we 
can compare the importance of crises for recent migrants relative to migrants who have 
been in the U.S. for many years.  This comparison provides some insights into how long 
it takes investor confidence to return following a crisis episode.  In addition, we can 
examine how the impact of a crisis varies with country of origin regulatory and financial 
system characteristics. What role does the overall development of the financial sector 
play? Is confidence more resilient for immigrants from countries with deposit insurance, 
or for immigrants from countries with less concentrated banking sectors, for example?   
 
Our work is related to Kelly and O’Grada (2000) who show that county of origin impacts 
investor behavior during a banking panic using a unique sample of Irish immigrants in 
the U.S.  We use a similar empirical strategy to study the impact of country of origin 
institutional quality on stock market participation (Osili and Paulson, 2008).  In related 
work, Fernandez and Fogli (2005) show that country-of-ancestry fertility and female 




Our findings indicate that living through a systemic banking crisis has important effects 
on future behavior.  Immigrants who come from countries that have experienced a 
banking crisis are less likely to have checking accounts in the U.S.  This finding is robust 
to including a vast array of individual controls including wealth, education, income, and 
age.  In addition, the effect of crises is robust to including country of origin fixed effects, 
which control for many other country characteristics including the level of economic and 
financial development and the quality of governance in the country of origin.  
 
We also find that aspects of the legal and regulatory environment at the time of the crisis 
have important effects on future investor behavior.  In particular, individuals who 
experience a crisis in a country that had deposit insurance in place prior to the crisis are 
as likely to have a checking account in the United States as their counterparts from the 
same country who migrated before the crisis.  This demonstrates that policy may play an 
important role in mitigating shocks to investor confidence caused by financial turmoil.    
 
The results are robust to addressing a number of econometric issues.  For example, the 
country of origin fixed effects estimates also address the possibility that unobserved 
individual attributes are correlated with country of origin measures of financial stability.  
                                                 
2 Carroll, Rhee and Rhee (1994 and 1999) also use a conceptually similar approach in their studies of the 
cultural determinants of savings.  Hendricks (2004) examines the behavior of immigrants in the U.S. to 
explain variation in hours worked across countries.  Borjas (1987) also looks at the impact of country-of-
origin characteristics on immigrant wage assimilation. We also control for time-varying country specific unobserved heterogeneity in some 
specifications. 
 
The next section describes the framework we use to derive the predicted relationship 
between bank crises and financial decisions.  In section 3, we describe the country and 
individual level data that we analyze.  Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy, discusses 
our findings and their robustness.  Section 5 presents conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Background and Framework 
 
Given our focus on banking crises, this paper draws on several strands of literature.  A 
large number of studies emphasize investor behavior during and following a crisis. In an 
influential model, Diamond and Dyvbig (1983) show that a self-fulfilling loss of 
confidence in the banking system may lead depositors to seek to withdraw their funds 
from banks, causing widespread failure of the banking system.
3 In Chari and Jagannathan 
(1998), asymmetric information about the quality of bank assets leads investors to 
withdraw their deposits.  
Because banks and other financial intermediaries play an important role in relaxing credit 
constraints and providing funds where profitable trading and investment opportunities 
exist, it is particularly important to understand how financial crises affect firms and 
households.
4 In a growing body of work, researchers have investigated the consequences 
of banking crises for real economic activity.  Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2005) 
find that growth in externally dependent sectors tends to be lower during banking crises. 
Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel, (2007) find that firms that are more dependent on 
external finance perform relatively worse during banking crises in countries with well-
developed financial systems. 
To date, few studies have explored how financial crises shape the beliefs and behavior of 
individuals. A notable exception is Kim and Wei (2002) who investigate foreign portfolio 
investors before and during the Korean currency crisis in late 1997.  They find that 
foreign portfolio investors outside Korea are more likely to engage in herding than the 
branches of foreign institutions in Korea or foreign individuals living in Korea.  They 
interpret this as evidence that investors in Korea have different information compared to 
those outside the country.   
 
An investor’s response to a banking crisis may be influenced by access to reliable 
information as well by government policies. However, the literature on how policies that 
are adopted during a banking crisis impact investor confidence is sparse.
5  Moreover, an 
                                                 
3 Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache, and Gupta (2000) find that banking crisis can occur, even when depositors 
do not withdraw their deposits, if other bank creditors seek to exit from the banking sector, or if banks 
become insolvent. 
4 See Levine (1997, 2005) and Kroszner and Strahan (2005) for surveys of the literature on financial market 
development. 
5 Claessens, Klingebiel and Laeven, (2001) and Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) use cross-country evidence 
to determine how policies adopted in the wake of the crisis influence the fiscal costs of resolving a crisis. investor’s exposure to a bank crisis may have long-term consequences for behavior if it 
shifts an individual’s expectations and attitudes (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
  
Framework 
It is helpful to sketch out a simple reduced-form framework in order to make the 
hypotheses that we test clear.  Consider an individual, i, from country J who is 
considering whether to open a bank account.  The individual’s demand for bank services 
is represented by: 
) , ( i i X R f S =  
 
where Si is the amount that individual i invests in the bank account, R is the expected 
return from the investment, and Xi is a vector of individual characteristics (risk aversion, 
wealth, income, education, years in the U.S., age at migration, and other characteristics) 
that affect the demand for bank services.   
 
The effect of bank crises is modeled by assuming that the investor believes there is some 
probability,  πi of a bank crisis that will impact returns to bank services.  Given her 
beliefs, the investor’s expected return on the investment will not be R, the expected return 
on the bank account, but πi x 0 + (1 – πi) x R.  This assumes that the return in the event of 
a crisis is zero.  Assuming that during a crisis returns are negative would not change the 
analysis.   
 
The probability that an investor places on the likelihood of a crisis may be a function of 
past experiences of financial crises in the country that investor was born in, J, which may 
in turn be a function of the length of time the investor spent in that country, yJ, and the 
length exposure that the investor has to the U.S., yUS: πi = π(J, yJ, yUS).  
 
An individual immigrant’s estimate of the likelihood of a bank crisis, πi, is likely to be 
higher for individuals who come from countries with particularly unstable financial 
systems and may be decreasing with years spent in the U.S.  To put the focus on the 
effect of living through a systemic banking crisis, we include country of origin fixed 
effects in all of the empirical estimates.  The fixed effects should address variation in πi 
that is due to the country origin level of economic and financial development and its 
quality of governance.   
 
Among similar immigrants from the same country, we expect πi to be higher and 
consequently demand for bank services in the U.S. to be lower for individuals who have 
lived through a crisis.  We also explore whether πi varies with the age at which an 
individual experienced a crisis and with how long they have lived in the U.S.   
 




The challenge in using individual data is to find meaningful variation in exposure to bank 
crises within a single data set.  We achieve this by looking at a sample of 3,644 immigrants from the 1996 Survey on Income and Program Participation (SIPP) who are 
over eighteen and who migrated to the U.S. after 1975.  We use information on date of 
arrival from internal SIPP files accessed through the Chicago Census Center to create the 
crisis exposure variable.  The internal files also include data on current county of 
residence, which we use as a control variable.  In addition, the public use SIPP data 
include detailed information on family structure, education, wealth, income and financial 
market participation.   
 
The main dependent variable in our analysis is the ownership of a checking account in 
the U.S.  However, we also examine other financial market decisions: the decision to 
open a savings account, and to own stock outside of a retirement account, the ownership 
of an individual retirement account (IRA) or Keogh account, and homeownership.   
 
Checking account ownership is relatively widespread compared to other financial assets: 
41 percent of immigrants have a checking account compared with 64 percent of the 
native-born.  Thirty-five percent of immigrants have a savings account, compared with 53 
percent of the native-born (see Table 2A). Five percent of the immigrant sample owns 
stock, compared with 18 percent of the native-born.  We study stock held outside of 
retirement accounts because these holdings are less likely to be determined by occupation 
and type of employer.  However, for comparison purposes we note that twice as many 
(30 percent) native-born households have an IRA or Keogh account compared to 
immigrant households.  About 56 percent of immigrants own their own homes compared 
to 73 percent of the native-born. 
 
We restrict the sample to immigrants who are over 18 for a total sample of 3,644 
observations.
6  Table 2A summarizes these data for immigrants and the native-born. 
Compared to the native-born, immigrants are younger, more likely to be married, non-
white and have more children.  Immigrants also tend to be less educated than the native-
born.  Thirty-eight percent of the immigrant sample has never completed high school 
compared to only 17 percent of the native-born sample.  However, the percentage of 
immigrants and the native-born who have an advanced degree is roughly the same at 7.3 
percent and 6.9 percent, respectively.   
 
Monthly per capita household income is significantly lower for immigrants compared to 
the native born.  For immigrants, average monthly per capita household income is 
$1,648, compared to $2,398 for the native-born.  In addition to having lower incomes, 
immigrant households have also accumulated less wealth compared to households headed 
by individuals who were born in the U.S.  The median immigrant household has wealth 
of $11,788 compared to $67,317 for the native-born. 
 
Additional immigrant characteristics are described in Table 2B.  Nearly sixty percent of 
the immigrants arrived in the U.S. after 1980.  Just under half of the immigrants were 
born in a North American country (including Mexico) and about 14 percent were born in 
                                                 
6 We restrict our attention to the first annual survey wave where financial market participation and wealth 
data are available.  Other SIPP data are collected quarterly.   Europe.
7  Most of the immigrants arrived in the U.S. as adults, with about 87 percent 
arriving at age twenty-one years or older.  
 
Bank Crisis Measures 
 
We use data provided in Honohan and Laeven (2005) to identify and date episodes of 
systemic banking sector crises.  The data cover the period 1976 to 2002 and include 98 
countries and 60 systemic crisis episodes.  Because the data include individuals who were 
interviewed in the U.S. in 1996, we focus on crises that occurred between 1976 and 1996.  
See Appendix Table 1 for a summary of the crisis periods by country.  Episodes of 
banking sector distress are considered systemic if non-performing assets reached at least 
10% of total assets at the peak of the crisis, if the cost of rescue operations was at least 
2% of GDP, if emergency measures (bank holidays, deposit freezes, blanket guarantees 
to depositors or other bank creditors) were taken, or if large-scale nationalizations took 
place.   
 
We use information on the country of origin of individual migrants together with data on 
when they arrived in the U.S. to create the bank crisis variable, Zij, for individual i from 
country j.  This variable is equal to one if the individual lived in their birth country during 
the crisis period and is equal to zero if they were living in the U.S. at the time of the crisis 
or if they come from a country that did not experience a systemic banking crisis between 
1976 and 1996.  For individuals who have experienced multiple bank crises, we use 
information from the first crisis.   
 
As an alternative measure of exposure to bank crises, we also look at how old people 
were when they were first exposed to a bank crisis.  This variable, Žijt, is equal to 
individual i’s age at the beginning of the first crisis they were exposed to and is equal to 
zero if they never lived through a systemic banking crisis.  As an example, consider 
immigrants from El Salvador which had one bank crisis in 1989.  Salvadorans who 
arrived in the U.S. between 1976 and 1988 will have Zij equal to zero.  Those who arrived 
after 1989 (and who are born before 1989) will have Zij equal to one.  Salvadorans who 
arrive after 1989 will have Žijt equal to their age in 1989.  Someone who was born in 
1979 is assigned Žijt equal to ten, for example. 
 
 
Other country-level data   
 
In addition to information on bank crises, we also examine the role of a number of other 
features of the financial and economic environment in the country of origin.  The 
country-level variables and their sources are described in Table 1.  Tables 3A and B 
provide summary information about these variables and their correlation with one 
another.  Country-level variables include: measures of bank freedom (Heritage 
Foundation), information on the availability of deposit insurance (from Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Kane and Laeven, 2007), bank branches per 100,000 people (from Peria, Beck and 
Demirgüç-Kunt, 2005). 
                                                 
7 Mexico accounts for just about one-third of the immigrants in the sample.  
In an effort to explore how the nature of the crisis impacts investor confidence, we 
examine several variables that describe the nature of the financial crisis.  These variables 
include whether the country experienced a GDP crisis at the same time as the banking 
crisis.  We define a GDP crisis period to be an episode of at least three consecutive years 
of negative GDP growth.  We also examine the role of having enacted deposit insurance 
prior to the banking crisis (combining information on the timing of the crisis from 
(Honohan and Laeven, 2005) with information on deposit insurance from Demirgüç-
Kunt, Kane and Laeven, 2007), the length of the banking crisis and the lowest GDP 
growth rate observed during the crisis (both from Honohan and Laeven, 2005). 
 
In addition to these variables that measure financial sector development and the nature of 
the crisis, we also examine the effect of other important aspects of the countries financial 
and economic development.  These variables include the level of economic development 
(average real GDP per capita over the 1976 – 1996 period), private credit (the value of 
credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2000), and a measures of the quality of governance – the 
KKZ index (Kaufman and Kray, 2000-2001).  
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
 
This section reports on our empirical findings.  We estimate an immigrant’s decision to 
have a checking account using the following linear probability model: 
 
Sisj = α + β1Xi + β2Zij + δj + δs + εisj, 
 
Where Sisj is the decision of individual i who lives in county s and comes from country j 
to have a checking account.  Individual controls are incorporated in Xi and include age, 
age squared, wealth quartiles, income, labor force status, education, sex, marital status, 
number of children in household, and race.  All of the specifications also include country 
of origin fixed effects, δj. A full set of county fixed effects are included in δs.  The 
variable Zij is equal to one if the individual immigrated to the U.S. after experiencing a 
banking crisis while they were living in their country of origin. 
 
All of the reported standard errors have been corrected to account for the 
heteroscedasticity that is implicit in the linear probability model and are also adjusted to 
allow for correlation across observations for immigrants who come from the same 
country and migrated during the same period.
8      
 
The relationship between financial behavior and systemic bank crises is explored in Table 
4 for checking account ownership.  The sample is restricted to immigrants who are at 
least 18 years of age and come from one of the 91 countries (excluding the U.S.) which 
                                                 
8 We use a linear probability model because it is computationally attractive given the large number of fixed 
effects, is consistent under weak assumptions and because the coefficient estimates are easy to interpret.  In 
particular, the coefficients on interaction terms are straight-forward to interpret (see Ai and Norton, 2003).  
Non-linear estimation methods, such as probit or logit, generate similar results.   are represented in the SIPP data.  The explanatory variables include age, age squared, 
wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, marital status, sex, race, education, number 
of children, controls for the country of origin as well as controls for the county where the 
immigrant lives in the U.S.    
 
There are two important reasons for including country of origin fixed effects.  First, there 
are many time-invariant country of origin characteristics that might influence the demand 
for various financial products.  These include the level of financial and economic 
development in the country of origin as well as the quality of institutions that protect 
private property and provide incentives for investment (see Osili and Paulson, 2008).  
Many of these variables are likely to be correlated with the experience of bank crises.  
Table 3B shows the correlation between the bank crisis variables and other country of 
origin characteristics. By including country of origin fixed effects, we ensure that the 
effect of bank crises is measured holding these (and other) country level variables fixed.   
 
The second reason for including country of origin fixed effects is to control for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity.  Immigrants are not random representatives of their 
country of origin.  They choose to migrate and that decision may be influenced by 
characteristics that are not observable.  If unobserved individual characteristics are 
correlated with coming from a country that has experienced a bank crisis, then we need to 
be concerned that our findings capture the effect of unobserved individual characteristics, 
rather than the effect of bank crises.  By including country-of-origin fixed effects, we 
eliminate correlation between unobserved individual attributes and country of origin. 
 
Looking first at the estimates of owning a checking account (column [1]) without wealth 
and income controls, we find that individuals who have experienced a bank crisis are 13.3 
percentage points less likely to have a U.S. bank account. When we include wealth and 
income controls in column [2], immigrants who have experienced a bank crisis are 10.8 
percentage points less likely to own a checking account compared to otherwise similar 
immigrants. This is 26 percent lower than the observed percentage of immigrants who 
have a checking account of 41 percent.  The effects of the other control variables 
included in the regressions are reported in Appendix Table 2. 
 
In order to explore the robustness of the baseline findings, we take advantage of the fact 
that whether or not a given immigrant will have had direct experience with a bank crisis 
depends on the country of origin, when that individual migrated to the US, and also on 
the age of the individual at the time of the crisis.  Individuals who are adults at the time of 
a bank crisis are more likely to have directly experienced the effects of the crisis 
compared to younger individuals. They are more likely to have had bank accounts and 
other financial assets whose values were impacted by the crisis, for example. 
 
To capture this effect, we create a new measure of having experienced a bank crisis 
which is equal to the individual’s age at the time of the crisis for individuals who were 
exposed to a banking crisis in their origin country prior to migrating to the U.S. The 
variable is equal to zero if the individual has not experienced a crisis.  In effect, the new 
measure, age at crisis, is equal to the interaction of “age at the start of the banking crisis” with “experience with a banking crisis”.  Specifically, for individuals who have 
experienced a banking crisis, it is defined as:  
 
= ijt Crisis at Age Year of Banking Crisis Beginsjt -Year of Birthijt 
 
Because “age at crisis” varies by country, by year of migration and by age, we can also 
include controls for the decade of migration in specifications which use age at crisis: 
 
Sisjdt = α + β1Xi + β2Žijt + md + δj + δs + δj x md+ εisjdt, 
  
Where Sisjdt represents the decision of individual i who lives in county s, comes from 
country j, migrated in decade d and who was born in year t to have a checking account.  
Age at crisis is represented by Žijt, md captures controls for the decade of migration and δj 
x md are country x decade of migration fixed effects. 
 
An extensive literature discusses how unobserved individual characteristics (such as 
ability) may vary with the timing of migration for a given country (see Borjas, 1994 and 
Borjas and Friedberg, 2006 for a review of this literature).  By including decade of 
migration controls interacted with country fixed effects, we can account for any 
correlation between experiencing a banking crisis and unobserved characteristics that are 
shared by a cohort of migrants from a given country.   
 
Individuals from the same country who migrated to the U.S. during a particular time 
period may share common characteristics such as unobserved ability, risk tolerance, or 
face similar labor market conditions in the U.S.  These “cohort” effects may affect the 
decision to own a bank account and be correlated with having experienced a bank crisis.  
By including decade of migration controls in the regression, we eliminate the correlation 
between the age at crisis variable and unobserved immigrant characteristics that vary with 
the timing of migration. 
 
As in the rest of the analysis, we include country fixed effects in all of the specifications.  
By including country of origin fixed effects, we eliminate correlation between 
unobserved individual attributes and country of origin characteristics.  We should also 
note that county fixed effects are included in all of the estimates, and this allows us to 
rule out other potential source of biases in the estimated coefficient for the effect of 
experiencing a bank crisis.
9   
 
Columns [3] – [6] of Table 4 report on the relationship between checking account 
ownership and age at crisis for various specifications.  In Column [3], the zero/one crisis 
variable is simply replaced with “age at crisis”.  According to this estimate, the effect of 
                                                 
9 Since location choice is non-random, immigrants who have experienced a bank crisis who choose to live 
in a county with a large fraction of immigrants from the same country may be systematically different 
along unobservable dimensions from immigrants who choose to live in a county with very few immigrants 
from the same country of origin. By including county fixed effects, we ensure that the coefficient on 
experiencing a bank crisis and age at crisis will be not be biased by unobserved characteristics that are 
correlated with the choice of county. living through a crisis is larger for those who were adults than for those who were 
children at the time of the crisis, as one might expect.  An individual who was 30 years 
old at the start of the crisis would be 9 percentage points less likely to have a checking 
account compared to someone from the same country who had not been exposed to the 
crisis.  Someone who was 45 at the time of the crisis would be 13.5 percentage points less 
likely to have a checking account.  We have also experimented with adding quadratic 
terms in age at crisis and did find some evidence that the age effect is non-linear.   
However, the coefficient on the age at crisis squared term was not significant, so we do 
not report on it here.   
 
In column [4] we add decade of migration fixed effects and in column [5] we add decade 
of migration interacted with country of origin fixed effects.  When we add these controls, 
we are effectively comparing the effect of a crisis on similar individuals from the same 
country of origin who all arrived in the U.S. in the same decade.  This eases concerns that 
the findings are driven by time varying unobserved heterogeneity.   
 
Migrating to the U.S. in response to a financial crisis is more plausible for people from 
some countries than from others.  In particular, it may be relatively easy for people from 
Mexico to adapt their migration plans in response to a crisis because of its geographic 
proximity to the U.S.  To make sure that the findings are not driven by immigrants from 
Mexico, we rerun the specification with country interacted with decade of arrival controls 
in Column [6] for a sample that drops immigrants from Mexico.  The results are 
unchanged.  We have also experimented with dropping additional immigrants from the 
Caribbean and Latin America with similar results.    
 
In addition, we analyzed Department of Homeland Security data on immigration flows by 
year and by country to see if the number of immigrants responds to crisis conditions in 
the country of origin.  There is no evidence that from the arrival data that migration flows 
respond to crises on average.    
 
 
The effect of bank crises on different types of people  
 
We turn now to analyzing how bank crises impact different groups of immigrants.  In 
Tables 5, we examine how the impact of a bank crisis varies with education, citizenship 
and time in the U.S.  These estimates help to identify the potential channels through 
which crises come to influence behavior and also serve as further robustness checks on 
our main results.   
 
We first examine how the impact of experience with a bank crisis changes with 
education.  Columns [2] and [3] present these results.  In columns [2] and [3], we include 
two crisis variables.  The first one is the usual one – an indicator variable that is equal to 
one if the individual experienced a bank crisis prior to coming to the U.S.  The second 
one is that variable interacted with low education (in column [2]) or with high education 
(column [3]).  Low education is equal to one if the immigrant in question has not completed high school and zero otherwise.  High education is equal to one if the 
immigrant has a college degree or more schooling.   
 
We find that most living through a crisis has a much larger impact on individuals with 
less than a high school degree.
10  On the other hand, individuals with a college degree or 
greater appear to be largely unaffected by living through a financial crisis.  It is 
interesting to note that education plays a role in mitigating the impact of experiencing a 
banking crisis despite the fact that educated immigrants are likely to have had more direct 
experience with banks and other financial institutions in their origin countries compared 
to the less-educated.   
 
Column [4] – [6] examine how the effect of living through a crisis changes with various 
measures of assimilation in the U.S.  In column [4], we look at how the effect of living 
through a crisis varies with years in the U.S.  Each additional year in the U.S. lowers the 
effect of living through a crisis on checking account ownership by 0.80 percentage 
points.  After being in the U.S. for 21 years, the effect disappears.  Note that each 
additional year in the U.S. has (at least) two effects: 1) it represents an additional year to 
get acclimated to the U.S. and 2) it represents an additional year of time since the crisis.  
The regression in column [4] does not distinguish between these two effects.   
 
In column [5], the interaction between the crisis variable and having lived in the U.S. for 
three years or less is added.  Among recent immigrants the effect of having experienced a 
crisis is much larger.  For recent immigrants who have experienced a bank crisis, 
checking account usage is 18 percentage points lower.  For their counterparts who have 
also experienced a bank crisis but who have lived in the U.S. for more than three years, 
checking account usage is predicted to be 9 percentage points lower.   Finally, in column 
[6] we examine the impact of becoming a naturalized citizen.  There is no statistically 
significant different behavior between naturalized citizens and other immigrants in terms 
of how living through a crisis impacts their checking account usage.   
 
 
The effect of other country characteristics 
 
In this section, we discuss how the effect of bank crises is influenced by other country 
characteristics.  Table 6 investigates to what extent the effect of a banking crisis varies 
with other country of origin characteristics by including the interaction of the 
“experienced a bank crisis” variable with other country characteristics.  Recall that all of 
these regressions include country of origin fixed effects.  This analysis considers how the 
effect of a banking crisis is influenced by the level of economic and financial 
development in the country of origin, as well as by measures of governance.   These 
estimates also serve as robustness checks on the baseline specification.   
 
We first include the interaction of experiencing a banking crisis with average real per 
capita GDP from 1976 to 1996 in the country of origin in the estimate presented in 
                                                 
10 This result mirrors the findings of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004 and 2005) who find that the effect 
of social capital is muted for those with greater education.   column [2] of Table 6.  We find that the interaction of experience with a bank crisis and 
average real GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant and statistically 
significant.  According to these results the effect of living through a bank crisis is smaller 
for immigrants who come from places where the overall level of development is higher. 
A one standard deviation increase in real GDP per capita over the 1976 to 1996 period is 
associated with a 4.7 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having a checking 
account for individuals who experienced a crisis, all else equal.    
 
The effect of overall economic development differs from the effect of financial 
development.  There is no significant difference in the effect of living through a bank 
crisis for people who come from places where there is greater private credit (column [3]) 
or bank freedom (column [4]) or more bank branches per 100,000 people (column [5]). 
Banking freedom captures the openness of the banking sector, including the degree to 
which foreign firms can enter the banking sector and to what extent there is government 
ownership of banks.  Several studies have argued that foreign banks provide a stabilizing 
influence during a crisis because they are subject to greater supervision and oversight 
from both host and home country regulatory institutions. Foreign banks may also provide 
outside resources to rescue failing banks.
11  Our findings suggest that experiencing a 
bank crisis in a country with greater bank freedom does not translate into significantly 
more confidence in the U.S. banking sector.   
                                                
 
In countries with more bank branches per 100,000 people, the banking sector is likely to 
better developed and this suggests the presence of a more extensive regulatory framework 
to monitor bank activities.  In addition, there are likely to be more people who have bank 
accounts and who would feel the impact of a crisis directly in these countries.  Despite 
this we find that the effect of experiencing a bank crisis does not vary significantly with 
the number of bank branches per 100,000 people in the country.    
 
Coming from a country that has good governance mitigates the effect of living through a 
crisis substantially, however, see column [6].  A one standard deviation increase in 
governance, as measured by the KKZ index, is associated with a 9 percentage increase in 
the likelihood of having a checking account after living through a crisis.  The net effect is 
that individuals who have experienced a banking crisis are 3 percentage points less likely 
to have a checking account (-11.7 + 9 = 3 percentage points).   
 
These findings suggest that economic development and good governance may play an 
important role in maintaining and/or restoring investor crisis during and following a 
systemic bank crisis. For example, investor confidence may be restored even in the face 
of a systemic bank crisis if credible government action is taken to resolve crisis and this 
credible government intervention is associated with high standards of institutional 




11 Although the presence of foreign banks may provide a stabilizing influence, their impact may be limited 
during a systemic crisis if foreign banks purchase distressed domestic banks (Cull and Martinez Peria, 
2007).   Does the Severity of the Banking Crisis Matter? 
 
There is a large literature that measures how the severity of a financial crisis impacts 
economic growth (see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Caballero and Hammour 
(1994) for example).  In Table 7, we investigate the effect of several measures of the 
severity of a banking crisis on subsequent investor behavior.  We also explore the effect 
of banking crises that are accompanied by additional economic shocks. 
 
For comparison purposes, we begin by examining the effect of experiencing a GDP crisis 
at the same time as a banking crisis in column [2].  A GDP crisis is defined as three 
consecutive years of negative GDP growth during the time period 1981-2001.   
Immigrants who live through a GDP shock at the same time they experience a systemic 
banking crisis have significantly different patterns of bank account ownership compared 
to otherwise similar immigrants who did not live through a GDP shock at the time of the 
banking crisis.  In particular, they are much less likely to have a checking account in the 
U.S. compared to immigrants who experienced a banking crisis that is not accompanied 
by a severe economic downturn. 
 
In column [3], we control for the lowest GDP growth rate experienced during the bank 
crisis period.  Including this control variable has little effect on the estimates.  In column 
[4], we examine how the length of the crisis influences investor behavior.  The length of 
the financial crisis does not have a significant impact on the likelihood of having a 
checking account in the U.S.   
 
Finally, we investigate how the availability of deposit insurance at the time of the crisis 
affects investor decisions (column [5]).  Individuals who experienced a bank crisis in a 
country that has explicit deposit insurance in place prior to the crisis are as likely to have 
a bank account in the U.S. as individuals who never experienced a banking crisis prior to 
moving to the U.S.  The estimates suggest that having deposit insurance prior to the crisis 
undoes the negative effect of living through a crisis on investor confidence.
12   
 
Do Banking Crisis Matter for other behavior? 
 
Finally, we explore the robustness of the link between checking account ownership and 
experiencing a banking crisis by considering the effect of banking crisis on other 
behavior.  In Table 8, we present estimates of experiencing a banking crisis on the 
decision to have any bank account, a savings account, to own stock, to own an IRA or 
Keogh account, to own a home and to be self-employed.  These estimates serve two 
purposes.  First, they allow us to test the hypothesis that the impact of a banking crisis 
varies with the degree to which the banking sector is required to make a particular 
                                                 
12 Interestingly, when we examined the effect of deposit insurance in general, rather than deposit insurance 
that is in place prior to the crisis, we find that deposit insurance weakens investor confidence (estimates 
available from the authors).  One reason for the contrast between the findings could be the moral hazard 
effects of deposit insurance.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detrigiache (2002) show that explicit deposit insurance is 
associated with increased bank fragility, especially in countries with weak institutions. 
 investment decision reasonable.  Second, these estimates address the possibility that 
experience with a banking crisis is proxying for some other unobserved attribute – risk 
aversion, for example -- that explains all sorts of behavior, not just behavior that should 
be impacted by experience with a banking crisis.  In other words, the regressions in Table 
8 tell us if living through a banking crisis matter more when we would expect it to and 
less when we would expect it not to.    
 
We find that experiencing a banking crisis also has a significant impact on other financial 
market decisions that are mediated through banks: having any bank account, a savings 
account or purchasing a home.  Compared to otherwise similar immigrants, immigrants 
who lived through a bank crisis in their country of origin are 7.3 percentage points less 
likely to own a home.  Interestingly, exposure to systemic bank crises does not appear to 
have a significant impact on stock market participation, IRA/KEOGH ownership or self-
employment.  Although investor confidence in banks appears to be shaken by bank 




5.  Conclusions 
 
Our findings indicate that systemic banking crises have important effects on investor 
confidence.  Immigrants who have experienced a banking crisis in their countries of 
origin are less likely to have bank accounts in the U.S.  This finding is robust to including 
important individual controls like wealth, education, income, and age, as well as country 
of origin fixed effects.  Individuals who experienced a crisis as adults are more likely to 
be impacted than younger individuals at the time of the crisis and the effect is particularly 
pronounced for immigrants with less education.  However, the effect of bank crises does 
not impact stock market participation.  This suggests that, although investors are unable 
to ignore their past bad experiences with banks in interacting with U.S. banks, these 
experiences do not spill over to non-bank investments.   
 
Overall, the findings suggest that systemic financial crises have important indirect effects 
on investor confidence.  Reduced investor confidence following a crisis is likely to be an 
important component of the cost of a systemic financial crisis and to make recovery more 
challenging.   
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 Table 1: Definitions and Sources of Banking Crisis Variables 
Variable Definition  and  Source
Bank Crisis 
Experienced Bank Crisis 
Age at Crisis 
 
An indicator of whether a country has experienced a systemic financial crisis between 1980 and 2001.  This information is 
combined with information from the 1996 Survey on Income and Program Participation (SIPP) on country of origin, year of 
migration to the U.S., and age to create “experienced bank crisis” which is equal to one if an individual lived through a 
systemic bank crisis and zero otherwise and “age at crisis” which is equal to an individual’s age at the beginning of the 
systemic bank crisis.  For individuals who experienced multiple crises, information from the first crisis that they experienced 
is used.  Source: Honohan, Patrick and Luc Laeven, 2005, Systemic Financial Distress: Containment and Resolution, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005 and authors’ calculations using 1996 SIPP data. 
Average GDP   Average real GDP per capita 1976-1996 (2000 dollars).   Source: Authors’ calculations using World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
Private Credit  A broad measure of financial intermediary development.  It is calculated as the value of credits by financial intermediaries to 
the private sector divided by GDP.  Source: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) 
Banking Freedom  An indicator of the relative openness of the banking and financial system, averaged over the period 1995-99: specifically 
whether foreign banks and financial services firms are able to operate freely, how 
difficult it is to open domestic banks and other financial services firms, how heavily regulated the financial system is, the 
presence of state-owned banks, whether the government influences allocation of credit, and whether banks are free to 
provide customers with insurance and invest in securities (and vice-versa).  The index ranges in value from 1 (very low) to 5 
(very high), calculated as 6 minus the banking freedom index of the Heritage Foundation.  Source: Heritage Foundation's 
Index of Economic Freedom 
Bank Branches per 100,000 
people 
Number of bank branches per 100,000 people.  
Source: Peria, Maria Soledad Martinez, Thorsten Beck  and Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Reaching Out: Access to and Use of 
Banking Services Across Countries.  http://econ.worldbank.org/ 
KKZ Index  A composite of six governance indicators (1998 data): voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption. Higher values correspond to better governance.  Source: Kaufman and Kray 
(2000-2001) 
GDP Crisis  An indicator of whether a country experienced three consecutive years of negative real per capita GDP growth during the 
period 1981-2001.  Source:  Author’s calculations using World Bank World Development Indicators 
Lowest GDP growth during 
Bank Crisis 
Lowest annual growth in GDP during period of Bank Crisis. Source: Honohan, Patrick and Luc Laeven, 2005, Systemic 
Financial Distress: Containment and Resolution, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005 
Length of Bank Crisis  Length of bank crisis in years.  Source: Honohan, Patrick and Luc Laeven, 2005, Systemic Financial Distress: Containment 
and Resolution, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005 
Deposit Insurance at Time of 
Crisis 
An indicator of whether a country had formal regulation requiring deposit insurance through central bank law, banking law, 
or the country’s constitution before the time of the country’s first crisis.  Source:  Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Edward J. Kane, and 
Luc Laeven, 2007, “Determinants of Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
Forthcoming. Table 2A: Characteristics of Immigrants and the Native Born in the SIPP Data 
 
Characteristic Native  Born Immigrant 
Individual Characteristics  45.30  37.53
Age (17.43) (13.58)
% Male  46.07 46.58
% Married 57.72    66.28  
% non-white  19.89 81.53
% unemployed or out of the labor force 33.21 34.24
# of children < 18 in household 0.74   1.42  
 (1.11) (1.45)
Average monthly per capita household income $2,397.93 $1,639.92
 (3073.94) (2575.34)
Median monthly per capita household  income $1676.40 $1057.60
Average household wealth  $171,563 $74,406
 (693,994) (205,059)
25
th percentile of household wealth  $13,522 $1,058
Median household wealth  $67,317 $12,061
75
th percentile of household wealth  $180,413 $62,694
 
Educational Attainment (%) 
Less than High School  17.05   37.67
High School Graduate  32.21 23.55
Some College  29.71 18.65
Bachelor Degree  14.15 12.76
Advanced Degree  6.89   7.36
Financial Market Participation (%) 
% with banking relationship  74.87 56.32
% with a checking account (interest or non-interest) 63.53 41.16
% with a savings account   53.16 35.79
%  own stock 17.84 5.45
% IRA/Keogh  18.17 5.17
Other characteristics (%) 
% own home  72.25 43.10
% self-employed 9.64 2.30
 
Number of Observations  49,109 3,817
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, mean values are reported.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Sample 
is restricted to the one wave of the 1996 Survey on Income and Program Participation with wealth 
information, to individuals 18 and over, to those who live in a county.  The immigrant sample is restricted 
to those who arrived in the U.S. after 1975. 
 Table 2B: Immigrant Characteristics  
 
Characteristic Immigrant
Year of Arrival in the U.S. (%)  
1975 – 1979  16.98
1980 – 1984  22.79
1985 – 1990  25.41
1991 – 1996  34.82
Age at Migration (%) 
five years or younger  2.33
six to ten years   1.25
Eleven to fifteen years  2.20
sixteen to twenty years          4.49
over twenty years  89.73
Continent of Origin (%) 




South America  6.45   
Australia and Oceania  0.19
Notes: Sample is restricted to the first wave of the 1996 Survey on Income and Program Participation with 
wealth information, to individuals 18 and over, and to those who were born abroad and who arrived in the 
U.S. after 1975.   
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Table 3A: Summary of Country and Crisis Variables 
Characteristic N  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Median Max  U.S.
value 
Measures of Banking Crisis 
Bank  Crisis  98 0.469 0.502 0 0 1 1
Average  GDP  84 8,704 10,376 106 3,208 42,873 24,831
GDP  Crisis  70 0.528 0.503 0 1 1 0
Private Credit  62 0.532 0.378 0.046 0.473 1.687 0.460
KKZ  Index    65 0.468 0.739 -1 0.33 1.72 1.29
Bank Freedom  65 3.468 0.763 2 3.333 5 4
Deposit  Insurance  89 0.674 0.471 0 1 1 1
Branches/100,000  people  71 16.62 17.462 0.41 9.59 95.87 30.86Table 3B: Correlation between Country Characteristics 







Bank Crisis  1.000
Average GDP  -0.141 1.000
GDP Crisis  0.083 -0.678*** 1.000
Private Credit -0.331*** 0.253** -0.377*** 1.000
KKZ Index   -0.404*** 0.196* -0.306** 0.634*** 1.000
Bank Freedom -0.218* -0.062 -0.061 0.414*** 0.469*** 1.000
Deposit Insurance  0.335*** -0.190* -0.082 0.009 0.080 -0.029 1.000
Branches/100,000 people  -0.301*** 0.189* -0.316*** 0.432*** 0.646*** 0.298** 0.248** 1.000
Notes: *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
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Table 4: Experiencing a Bank Crisis and Checking Account Ownership  
 
Explanatory Variable  [1]









Age at Crisis 
[4]

















Experienced Bank Crisis  -0.133*** -0.108***  
            (0.028)           (0.025)  
Age at Crisis  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.002*** -0.003***
            (0.001)           (0.001)           (0.001)           (0.001)
Decade of Migration Fixed Effects    Yes Yes Yes
Decade of Migration * Country Effects    Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-Squared 0.2911 0.3114 0.3111  0.3111 0.3225 0.2916
Number of Observations  3644 3644 3644  3644 3644 2506
Number of Countries  91 91 91  91 91 90
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, regressions [2] – [5] include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, income 
squared, marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children, and county controls.  Regression [1] does not include income and wealth but does include 
the other explanatory variables.  The number of observations differs depending on the number of countries for which a particular measure is available.  A linear 
probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country-cohort level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. Table 5: Experiencing a Bank Crisis and Individual Attributes 
Dependent Variable: Checking Account Ownership 
 








Bank Crisis * 




Bank Crisis * 
Arrived in US in 
Last 3 years 
[6]
Citizens 
Experienced Bank Crisis  -0.108*** -0.039 -0.128***    -0.166*** -0.090*** -0.113***
               (0.025)              (0.029)               (0.025)                (0.025)              (0.026)             (0.027)
Crisis*Low Education  -0.136***   
 (0.016)  
Crisis*High Education  0.123*** 
  (0.042) 
Crisis*Years in the U.S.    0.008***
   (0.002)
Crisis*Arrived in U.S. in last 3 yrs    -0.090***
   (0.018)
Crisis*U.S. Citizen   0.036
                (0.048)
Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-Squared   0.3114 0.2933 0.2937  0.3128 0.3131 0.3114
Number of Observations  3644 3644 3644  3644 3644 3644
Number of Countries  91 91 91  91 91 91
Notes:  In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, income 
squared marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children, and county controls.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country-cohort level.  High education immigrants are those with a bachelor’s degree or more education.  Low education 
immigrants are those with less than a high school degree.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 
5% level, * at at least the 10% level.  
 
 Table 6: Experiencing a Bank Crisis and Country Characteristics 
Dependent Variable: Checking Account Ownership 
 













Experienced Bank Crisis  -0.108*** -0.124*** -0.142***  -0.114 -0.109* -0.117***
       (0.025)      (0.029)      (0.037)  (0.080)          (0.061)      (0.026)
Crisis*Average GDP per capita
†  0.455**  
         (0.202)  
Crisis*Private Credit            0.120 
          (0.092) 
Crisis*Bank Freedom           -0.001
          (0.028)
Crisis*Bank Branches/100,000             0.001
           (0.007)
Crisis*KKZ Index of Inst Quality    0.127**
           (0.055)
Country Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3114 0.3166 0.3241  0.3243 0.3281 0.3249
Number of Observations  3644 3301 2914  3067 2906 3067
Number of Countries  91 67 55  57 62 57
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, income 
squared marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children, and county controls.  The number of observations differs depending on the number of 
countries for which a particular measure is available.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at 
the country-cohort level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% 
level.  
†Coefficient and standard error are the actual ones multiplied by 100,000. 
 
 Table 7: Experiencing a Bank Crisis and Characteristics of the Crisis 
Dependent Variable: Checking Account Ownership 
   
Explanatory Variable  [1]
Baseline 
[2]
GDP Crisis at Crisis 
[3] 
Lowest GDP growth 
[4]




Experienced Bank Crisis  -0.108 -0.063**  -0.115*** -0.010** -0.129***
  (0.025) (0.030)                    (0.033) (0.046)                    (0.027) 
Crisis*GDP Crisis at Crisis  -0.068***
              (0.020)
Crisis*Lowest GDP Growth                       -0.160
                     (0.350)
Crisis*Length of Bank Crisis                      -0.001
                      (0.005)
Crisis*Deposit Insurance at crisis  0.121***
                     (0.032)
Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3114 0.3327   0.3060 0.3060 0.3136
Number of Observations  3644 2930 2578 2578 3542
Number of Countries  91 62 39 39 77
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, income 
squared marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children, and county controls.  The number of observations differs depending on the number of 
countries for which a particular measure is available.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering at 




Table 8: Experiencing a Bank Crisis and Other Investment Decisions 
 
 




















 Experienced Bank Crisis   -0.108*** -0.151*** -0.090*** 0.008 -0.016 -0.073***  -0.003
            (0.025)          (0.034)          (0.025) (0.006) (0.019)         (0.022) (0.020)
Country Fixed Effects   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-Squared   0.3114 0.3198 0.2297  0.2302 0.1876 0.5001 0.1001
Number of Observations  3644 3644 3644 3644 3644 3644  3644
Number of Countries  91 91 91 91 91 91 91
Notes: In addition to those reported on here, all of these regressions include controls for age, age squared, wealth quartiles, labor force status, income, income 
squared marital status, sex, ethnicity, education, number of children, and county controls.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country-cohort level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  *** indicates significance at at least the 1% level, ** at at least 
the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
         
   
 Appendix Table 1: Bank Crisis and GDP Crisis  
Countries and Years 
 
 Country Year(s)  of  Banking Crisis Year(s) of GDP Crisis 





3 Armenia  1994–96 1993 
4 Australia  None None 
5 Austria  None None 
6 Bahamas  None 1992 
7 Bangladesh  1987–96 None 
8 Barbados  None No Data 
9 Belgium  None None 
10 Belize  None 1983-85,1996-97 
11 Bermuda  None No Data 
12 Bolivia  1986–88, 1994-1995 1981-86 
13 Brazil  1990,  1994-99 1983,1992 
14 Burma  None No Data 
15 Cambodia  None No Data 
16 Canada  None 1992 
17 Caribbean  None None 
18 Chile  1976,  1981-83 None 
19 China  1998–2002 None 
20 Colombia  1982–87 None 
21 Costa  Rica  1994–96 1982 
22 Cuba  None No Data 
23 Czech  Republic  1989–91 1993 
24 Czechoslovakia  None No Data 
25 Denmark  None None 
26 Dominica  None None 
27 Dominican  Republic  None None 
28 Ecuador 1980-1983,  1996-97,1998-01 None 
29 Egypt 1980-1983 None 
30 El  Salvador 1989 1981-82 
31 Ethiopia  None 1990-92 
32 Fiji  None No Data 
33 Finland 1991–94 1992-93 
34 France  None None 
35 Germany  None None 
36 Ghana  1982–89 1981-83 
37 Greece  None 1982-83 
38 Grenada  None None 
39 Guatemala  None 1983-86,2003 
40 Guyana  None 1984,1990 
41 Haiti  None 1983-90,1994-95, 2002-03 
42 Holland  None No Data 
43 Honduras  None 1982-83 
44 Hong  Kong  None None 
45 Hungary 1991–95 1992-93 
46 India  None None 
47 Indonesia  1997–2002 None 
 Appendix Table 1: Bank Crisis and GDP Crisis  
Countries and Years 
 
 Country Year(s)  of  Banking Crisis Year(s) of GDP Crisis 
48 Iran  None 1981,1986-88 
49 Iraq  None No Data 
50 Israel  1977–83 2003 
51 Italy  None None 
52 Jamaica  1996–2000 1998 
53 Japan  1992–2001 None 
54 Jordan  None 1989-91 
55 Kenya  1985–89, 1992, 1993-95 1983-84,1993-94 
56 Korea/South  Korea  1997–2002 None 
57 Laos  None No Data 
58 Latvia  1995–96 1992-93 
59 Lebanon  1988–90 No Data 
60 Lithuania  1995–96 1993-94 
61 Malaysia  1997–2001 None 
62 Mexico  1981–91, 1994-2000 1988 
63 Morocco  1980-1983 None 
64  New Zealand  None 1989-91 
65  Nicaragua 1987-1989 1986-93 
66  Nigeria 1991–95 1983-84,1995 
67  Norway 1990–93 None 
68 Pakistan  None None 
69 Palestine  None No Data 
70 Panama  1988–89 1989 
71 Peru  1983–90 1990 
72 Philippines  1983–87, 1998-2002 1985,1993 
73 Poland 1992–95 No Data 
74 Portugal  None None 
75 Romania  1990–96 1990-92,1999 
76 Russia  1995,  1998-99 1992-96 
77 Saudi  Arabia  None 1983-87,1995 
78 Singapore  None None 
79 Slovakia/Slovak  Republic  None 1992-93 
80 South  Africa  None 1987,1992-93 
81 Spain  1977–85 None 
82 Sweden  1991–94 1993 
83 Switzerland  None 1993 
84 Syria  None 1984 
85 Taiwan  None No Data 
86 Thailand 1983–87, 1997-2002 None 
87 Trinidad  &  Tobago  None 1985-89 
88 Turkey 1982–85, 2000-2002 None 
89 UK  None None 
90 Ukraine  1997–98 1992-98 
91 Uruguay 1981–84, 2002 1984,2001-02 
92 USSR  None None 
93 Venezuela  1994–95 1981-85 
94 Vietnam 1997–2002 No Data 
95 Yugoslavia  None No Data 
  
Appendix Table 2: The Effect of Control Variables on Having a Checking Account 
Explanatory Variable 
Age






nd Wealth Quartile  0.134***
 (0.022)
3
rd Wealth Quartile  0.170***
 (0.032)
4
th Wealth Quartile   0.135***
 (0.027)
Unemployed or Out of Labor Force  -0.069***
 (0.020)
Per Capita Income
††   18.4***
 (6.56)
Per Capita Income Squared
††  -0.001***
  (0.000)  
Male   -0.041***
  (0.014)  
Married 0.171***
 (0.020)
Number of Children  -0.020***
 (0.006)
Non-white -0.050
 (0.044)   
High School Graduate   0.126***
   (0.025) 
Some College  0.190***
 (0.024)
Bachelor Degree  0.243***
 (0.034)
Advance Degree  0.307***
 (0.041)
Experienced  Bank Crisis   -0.108***
 (0.025)
Constant    0.051
 (0.105)
County Fixed Effects  Yes
   
Adjusted R-Squared 0.3111
Number of Observations  3644
Notes: Dependent variable is equal to one if the respondent owned stock during the interview period in 
question and is zero otherwise.  A linear probability model is used and standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country-cohort level.  Standard errors are in parentheses. The 
reported coefficients and standard errors of explanatory variables marked by a † are the actual ones 
multiplied by 100, by a †† are multiplied by 1,000,000.  The lowest wealth quartile is the omitted wealth 
category, and the omitted education category is less than high school graduate.  *** indicates significance 
at at least the 1% level, ** at at least the 5% level, * at at least the 10% level. 
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